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Abstract
Purpose – Building on the risk balancing theory and on recent discussions the appropriateness
of using farm income maximization as behavioural assumption, this paper extends the risk balancing
framework by accounting for business-household interactions. The purpose of this paper is to
theoretically introduce the concept of farm household risk balancing, a theoretical framework in which
the farm household sets a constraint on the total household-level risk and balances farm-level and
off-farm-level risk.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper argues that the risk behaviour of farmers is better
understood by considering risk at the household level. Using an analytical framework, equations
are derived linking the farm activities, off-farm activities, consumption and business and
private liquidity.
Findings – The framework shows that a farm household that wants to minimize the risk that total
household cash flow falls below consumption needs, may exhibit a wide variety of behavioural
responses to changes in the policy and economic environment.
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Social implications – The framework suggests multiple ways for policy makers and individual
farmers to support risk management.
Originality/value – Risk management is at the core of the agricultural policy and it is of paramount
importance to be able to understand behavioural responses to market and policy instruments. This
paper contributes to that by suggesting that the focus of current risk analysis and management studies
may be too narrowly focused at the farm level.
Keywords Business risk, Business-household interactions, Financial risk, Off-farm income
Paper type Conceptual paper
Introduction
Acknowledging that many farm households in the EU attract a substantial part of their
income from non-agricultural sources, this paper theoretically introduces the concept of
farm household risk balancing. As a theory, risk balancing suggests that changes in the
farm policy and/or economic environment can lead to unanticipated behavioural
responses at the farm household level. The paper further describes the implications of this
novel concept for policy makers and researchers. Risk analysis and risk management are
important issues that have sparked considerable interest among agricultural economists
and policy makers. Only relatively recently, the importance of risk management has
entered policy and extension debates in the EU (Tangermann, 2011). With the phasing out
of guarantees provided by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU, the issue of
risk management is gradually acquiring an ever more important role, which is reflected in
a series of innovations that first appeared in the 2009 Health Check, and later in the
proposed commission regulation for rural development policy 2014-2020 (Capitanio et al.,
2013). Researchers, on the other hand, have long since recognized that risk management at
the individual farm level is one of the greater challenges for the farming community
(e.g. Just, 2003; Richardson et al., 2000). However, several authors assert that there is a
strong case that the handling of risk in policymaking in the agricultural and resource
sectors leaves scope for improvement (e.g. Hardaker and Lien, 2010; Just, 2003).
One of the most important areas in this respect relates to the behavioural response of
farmers in reaction to changes in the economic and policy environment. Farming
systems theory views a farm as a unique, goal-setting purposeful system (Dillon, 1991).
Farmers are active decision makers and changes in the environmental, policy and
economic situation induce them to change certain aspects of their farming business.
Depending on the behavioural response policy measures aimed at obtaining one
particular goal (e.g. income stabilization) may have adverse effects on alternative goals.
How these adverse effects may appear depends on how the objective (income) is
targeted and measured, the assumed behavioural objectives of farmers and the focus of
agricultural policy. Increasingly, scholars acknowledge that the focus of agricultural policy
and research on a measure of farm income goes beyond what is really going on in the
majority of farm households, even in developed countries (Freshwater, 2007). In those
countries where an adequate measurement of income at the household level exists, such as
the USA, evidence shows that only a minority of farm households earn the majority of
their income from agricultural sources, so that the use of a measure of farm income to
assess farmers’ well-being is flawed (United Nations, 2007). While these issues are gaining
considerable agreement, the majority of agricultural economics research is still focusing on
a measure of farm income as its target variable and risk research in agriculture is no
exception to this case. Yet, in farm households where a significant proportion of the overall
household income is coming from non-agricultural sources, an interaction may exist
between both the level and riskiness of the agricultural and the non-agricultural income.
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This paper presents a novel theoretical framework in which the farm household sets
a constraint on the total household-level risk and balances farm and off-farm risk.
We argue that the risk behaviour of farmers is better understood by considering risk at
the household level. By taking farm household income and not just farm income as
the focal point of our behavioural assumptions, we consider a much wider variety
of behavioural responses to changes in the policy and economic environment. The
original risk balancing framework (Gabriel and Baker, 1980) describes how financial
risk (FR) and business risk (BR) are trade-offs in the risk behaviour of farmers. Our
model shows that changes affecting the BR at the farm level might just as well induce
changes at the household level (e.g. changes in off-farm employment or non-farm
investments) and not just changes in the farm financial position.
Our frame of reference is targeted towards industrialized country agriculture, but
with specific reference to the European research community and policy making arena.
In the EU, the questionable relevance of a measure of farm income for analysing
farmers’ policy responses and for evaluating the contribution of policy to farm
households’ well-being, is particularly neglected. This may in part be explained by a
disconnect between data collection on the one hand, and research and policy making on
the other. As a result, there is no incentive to make changes to the current data
collection systems, which reinforces the lack of research efforts. This phenomenon has
already been described in the context of rural planning policy, by, amongst others,
Bomans et al. (2010). It is also related to Van der Ploeg’s (2003) concept of the virtual
farmer, namely a farmer as seen by the CAP, which is often very remote from the
realities of the daily life of a real farmer. Our paper addresses this disconnect, by
developing a stylized model of risk balancing behaviour that explains farm-household
interactions with risk optimization behaviour. Due to the lack of data resulting from the
vicious circle, we have to rely largely on indirect evidence to support our case.
Nevertheless, we also provide brief empirical evidence of farm-household interactions,
based on farm and household data from a sample of Swiss farms.
The main contributions of this paper are presenting a novel theoretical framework
describing a farm household’s risk behaviour, thus advancing the argument that the
farm household is the preferred level of analysis for risk (management) research,
extending the original risk balancing framework to the household level and
highlighting the need to adapt data collection systems in the EU if research is to
adequately inform agricultural policy design. Important implications for policy makers
and researchers are discussed. Focusing on the role of liquidity in agricultural
household risk management, our model presents a link between liquidity reserves and
agricultural risk management policies which is very important, yet largely ignored in
the literature (Pedersen and Olsen, 2013).
This paper is structured as follows. The second section reviews the existing
literature on risk management policies and on the measurement of farm household
income, demonstrating the importance of considering the household level in risk
(management) analysis. The third section introduces the conceptual and operational
measures for household risk and its constituents. In the fourth section we show that, for
a farm household with income from and an investment portfolio both within and
outside agriculture that is optimizing household income risk, risk behaviour may
involve a trade-off between total farm risk and household-level risk and provide a
behavioural equation with important implications. The fifth section provides evidence
from our own analysis on Swiss farm households, and briefly summarizes the available
literature in support of our model. A more detailed paper with greater empirical depth
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that complements the theoretical model that follows can be found in de Mey et al. (2015).
The next section discusses the implications for this in terms of agricultural policy. The
last section summarizes and concludes.
Household-level policy and risk (management) analysis in agriculture
Risk management policies
Farm support policies in the EU have long been in place in several member states to
provide income support for individual farmers depending on their size, production
practices, output orientation and levels of market prices. Recently, risk management
and income stabilization in agriculture have become a central point of European and
national agricultural policies, induced by a growing consensus that the agricultural
sector will face increased price and production volatility (OECD, 2011). Accordingly,
the focus of farm support policies has recently shifted towards more specific risk
mitigation policies (Cafiero et al., 2007), in addition to a remaining focus on farm-level
support. Recent estimates show that this support is again on the rise in 2012, after a
historically low in 2011 (OECD, 2013). Also recently, the European Commission has
suggested in its new proposed CAP reform a risk management toolkit as part of the
Pillar 2 rural development measures that allow member states the opportunity to
develop a mix of instruments (insurance, mutual funds, income stabilization tools)
consistent with their current national insurance systems and laws (Tangermann, 2011).
In order to improve new policy measures directed towards risk and risk management,
policy makers and researchers need to be able to predict how farmers will respond to
changes in the institutional environment. Policy makers and researchers should
look beyond intended effects and be especially concerned with unanticipated effects. As
Freshwater (2002, p. 465) puts it “It is not appropriate to conclude that a program is
successful if it has met its stated goals but has created significant harm in other areas”.
Several unanticipated responses with regards to risk management policies have already
been identified. Previous studies reveal that risk-reducing or income stabilizing government
programs could induce risk-taking behaviour for farmers, e.g., growing more risky crops
(Turvey, 2012), have adverse environmental externalities, e.g., reduced biodiversity
(Di Falco and Perrings, 2005), or crowd-out other instruments, e.g., subsidized insurance
schemes potentially reduce farmers’ participation in forward contracting opportunities to
hedge prices (Coble et al., 2000). Another unanticipated effect is risk balancing, originally
postulated by Gabriel and Baker (1980). Risk balancing refers to the fact that farmers
strategically adjust the level of FR in response to exogenous changes in BR. On the one
hand risk balancing entails a rational risk management strategy when farmers lower FR in
response to an increase in BR; when on the other hand more FR is taken when the BR
position improves, it involves an unanticipated entrepreneurship strategy to restore the
original total risk level (de Mey et al., 2014). The latter case led several authors to the notion
of the paradox of risk balancing or the fact that when income-enhancing or BR-reducing
policies (e.g. price stabilization policies) induce farmers to increase their FR, their overall
risk position is left unchanged or even worse off (Featherstone et al., 1988). The occurrence
of risk balancing supports the policy goal of stimulating innovation and entrepreneurship,
but the purpose of providing the farming population with a stable farm income, however,
could be jeopardized by off-setting increases in the FR position.
Farm income as the focal point of agricultural policy
Initially, the focus of income support policy and research was the farm household, but
in the 1970s it changed to the farm enterprise (Freshwater, 2007). As a result, the
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implicit assumption became that a farm household maximizes farm income. However,
sufficient evidence exists that shows that the majority of farm households in the USA
and Canada, attract a significant part of their income from non-agricultural sources
(Freshwater, 2007; Mishra et al., 2002). It is estimated that also in the EU many farm
households attract a significant portion of their total household income from off-farm
sources (OECD, 2003). For instance, a recent survey in the Flanders region in Belgium
showed that only 34 per cent of the farming population had only agricultural income,
the remaining 66 per cent attracting on average 35 per cent of their household income
from elsewhere (Wauters et al., 2014). A survey among farmers in Ireland showed that
25 per cent of the population attracted income from non-agricultural sources (Hennessy
and Rehman, 2008). Earlier data from Austria (McNamara andWeiss, 2005) and France
(Benjamin and Kimhi, 2006) also showed that many farmers spent a significant share of
their time working time on non-agricultural activities. In Austria, about half of the farm
households spent 50 per cent or more of their available working time off the farm.
In France, 33 per cent of the male farmers and 42 per cent of the spouses reported
working off the farm.
Farmers are known to be able to adapt to unanticipated changes in farm income, by
cutting down household expenses, or by using household liquidities and/or capitalizing
household/farm assets. Hence, Freshwater (2007) argued that the behavioural
assumption of farmers maximizing farm income is no longer tenable and that to
assess the impact of income support policies on welfare, the focus should return to the
farm household. Already Gasson’s (1973), seminal paper showed that farmers have a
broad range of goals and values and that farm income maximization is only one of them.
The relative priorities that are attached to each value explains farmers’ economic
behaviour when confronted with a choice (Gasson et al., 1988). More recently, Lien et al.
(2006) found that profit maximization as a goal was ranked rather low by both full-time
and part-time crop and dairy farmers. Having a reliable and stable income, however, was
ranked among the most important goals. Wallace and Moss (2002) also consider a series
of alternative goals aside from conventional profit maximization and quantify the trade-
off between family and farm goals. Profit maximization might be sound behavioural
assumption for corporate/commercial farms, yet in 2010, 97 per cent of all farms in the
EU were considered family farms (European Commission, 2013). Their importance in the
agricultural chain might increase over time (Brookfield, 2008; Schmitt, 1991) and they are
found to remain operational according to the notion of the disappearing middle in the size
distribution of farms (Weiss, 1999). In her Agricultural and Applied Economics
Association presidential address, Offutt (2002) also emphasized the importance of
understanding the microeconomic behaviour at the household level in order to succeed in
effective design and implementation of farm policies.
Risk analysis and management in agriculture: a new focus on the household level
Combining the findings of the two preceding sections, we advance the argument that the
analysis of risk and risk management in agriculture should consider the farm household as
the preferred level of analysis rather than focusing solely on the farm. This implies that
measures of off-farm and total household-level risk are needed. The interdependence
between the farm household and the farm is strong as they are intertwined both in terms of
physical location and labour supply. There is also a financial dependency as farm and family
accounts frequently coincide or are used for both purposes. The strong interaction between
the farm and the farm household permits farm operational decisions to be influenced by, and
to have influence on, a much broader range of alternative household-related factors than is
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assumed under the behavioural assumption of profit-maximization. For example,
Jetté-Nantel et al. (2011) found that Canadian farmers’ operational (production) decisions
are influenced by off-farm income.
There is also a policy-related reason to start focusing more on household-level risk.
The Agenda 2000 reform of the CAP still listed ensuring a fair standard of living for
the agricultural community as an objective and further explicitly acknowledged the
stability of farm incomes and the creation of abundant alternative income opportunities
for farmers and their families as goals of the CAP. These objectives are clearly
formulated with the farm household as the social unit in mind and hence in order to
assess to what extent risk management policies succeed in realizing these objectives, a
measure of household risk is warranted.
Whereas in the past, risk research mainly used aggregate data sets ( Just, 2003),
research and policy analysis on risk (management) is increasingly focusing on farm-level
analyses (e.g. Kimura et al., 2010), which is important as averaging may substantially
misrepresent the risk farmers are facing at the individual level ( Just andWeninger, 1999).
We argue, however, that a final step towards better risk research and policy analysis is
considering the farm household as the decision making unit[1], not ignoring the
household layer of risk. Although the notion that farm household risk exposure and
management is not limited to simply farm-level aspects and thus the household-level
should be considered has been previously discussed in US/Canada-based research
(e.g. Barnett and Coble, 2009; Freshwater and Jette-Nantel, 2011), EU-based research
(e.g. Cafiero et al., 2007; Vrolijk et al., 2009) and has been pointed out by the OECD (2009,
2011), the fact that this notion has yet to permeate the agricultural risk management
discipline in practice is quite surprising.
Conceptualizing and operationalizing household risk
This section will introduce the different risk concepts used in our extended risk
balancing framework and present specifications to operationalize these concepts.
BR
BR is the risk inherent in the farming operation and is independent of the way the
operation is financed (Gabriel and Baker, 1980; Barry et al., 1981). BR is generally
operationalized using a measure of farm return that is not influenced by the financing
decision (such as Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization,
operational cash flow or the rate of return on assets). From a probability distribution of
any of these result parameters, several measures of risk may be derived, such as the
coefficient of variation, the value-at-risk or the probability of a predefined disastrous
outcome. Each measurement concept results in an alternative, yet identical
representation of BR that leads up to analogous versions of the risk balancing
model. For the remainder of this paper we will work with cash-based definitions as this
definition allows the transition to the household level (United Nations, 2007). Following
Gabriel and Baker (1980), we define BR in terms of a coefficient of variation:
BR ¼ sCFo
CFo
(1)
where CFo represents expected operational cash flow and σCFo its standard deviation.
The two major causes of BR in the farm are unexpected variability in production and in
the prices of inputs and outputs. Whereas the level of BR is mainly influenced by
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external sources (e.g. market conditions, policy changes, environmental circumstances,
the weather, pests and diseases), internal factors such as productive efficiency and
general management skills might also play a role.
FR
FR is defined as the added variability on the return for owners of equity that results
from the cash obligations associated with debt financing (Gabriel and Baker, 1980).
Primarily, this risk results from the use of debt as leverage, which multiplies the
potential BR that will be generated (Boehlje, 2002). Of course, there are other risks
involved in the use of debt, most notably risks arising from uncertainties in the
cost (interest rate) and availability of debt (Boehlje, 2002). FR can be specified as
(Gabriel and Baker, 1980):
FR ¼
sCFno
CFoI f
sCFo
CFo
(2)
where sCFno represents the standard deviation of operational cash flow with debt
financing, but before the deduction of fixed debt servicing payments of the farm If.
When working in cash flow terms, If involves both interest paid and principal, but only
interest when using income-based definitions. Rewriting this expression and assuming
no leverage-induced changes in the variability of cash flows yields[2]:
FR ¼ sCFo
CFo
I f
CFoI f
(3)
This equation demonstrates that FR can be regarded as a multiple of BR with the
right-hand multiplier term reflecting the finance decision. When If equals 0, FR is 0,
and total risk comprises only BR.
Total farm risk
Analogous to the definition of BR, the total risk of the farm (TRf) is generally reflected
in the variability of farm cash flow (defined as operational cash flow after debt
financing deductions: CFf¼CFo−If) or alternatively using accounting definitions in the
rate of return to equity. More formally:
TRf ¼
s CFoI fð Þ
CFoI f
¼ sCFo
CFoI f
(4)
where the second equation removes If from the standard deviation as it is assumed to
be a fixed amount (an assumption made throughout this section).
Off-farm risk
Analogous to FR, we define off-farm risk (OFR) as the difference between the
variability of household cash flow(defined as operational cash flow minus fixed debt
servicing obligations plus off-farm cash flow: CFh¼CFo−If+CFof) and the variability
of operational cash flow after debt financing deductions (i.e. TRf):
OFR ¼ sCFh
CFh
 sCFo
CFoI f
(5)
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where CFh represents expected household cash flow and sCFh its standard deviation.
Rearranging Equation (5) as follows:
OFR ¼ sCFo
CFoI f
sCFh
sCFo
CFf
CFh
1
 
(6)
which demonstrates that – analogous to FR – OFR can be regarded as a multiple of
TRf, where the multiplier now depends on both the share of farm cash flow in
household cash flow and their relative variability.
Total household risk
Total household risk (TRh) is the variability of household cash flow from all sources
and is defined as[3]:
TRh ¼
sCFh
CFh
¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
s2CFoþs2CFof þ2Cov CFo;CFof
 q
CFoI f þCFof
(7)
TRh thus depends positively on: the variability of operational cash flow; the variability
of off-farm cash flow; the interdependency of operational and off-farm cash flow; the
fixed debt servicing obligation and depends negatively on expected operational cash
flow and expected off-farm cash flow. An important implication of the interdependency
of operational and off-farm cash flow is that when operational cash flow and off-farm
cash-flow are countercyclical, i.e. regarding correlated in the covariance term, total
household risk decreases, but increases when they are procyclical.
A first special case of Equation (7) is when there is no off-farm cash flow, i.e., a farm
focuses entirely on agricultural production. In this case CFof , s2CFof and Cov(CFo, CFof)
are equal to zero, and expression (7) reduces to:
TRh ¼
sCFo
CFoI f
¼ TRf (8)
This special case amounts to the Gabriel and Baker (1980) framework, and suggests
that when a decision maker can identify a constraint on TRh, risk balancing between
BR and FR may occur. Consider, for instance, that the decision maker identifies β as the
maximum bearable level of TRh[4]. Then Equation (8) can be rewritten as:
TRh ¼
sCFo
CFo
CFo
CFoI f
pb (9)
A shock in for instance price variability, causing sCFo and hence BR to lower, can lead
to an adjustment in the financing decision, with an equivalent increase in If. This
decision may be a pure financing decision, an investment decision or both.
A second special case is when off-farm cash flow is non-zero but fixed,
e.g., when a farmer family member has a steady extra off-farm job. In that case,
the variability of off-farm cash flow and its covariance with operational cash flow
equals zero:
TRh ¼
sCFo
CFoI f þCFof
(10)
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Rewriting this equation and considering an equivalent risk constraint β yields:
TRh ¼
sCFo
CFo
CFo
CFoI f
CFoI f
CFoI f þCFof
pb (11)
This equation shows that a decision maker that sets a constraint on TRh can assume
more BR and/or FR when off-farm cash flow is positive and less when it is negative.
This equation further shows that, in reaction to an exogenous shock that decreases
sCFo and hence BR, a decision maker with the objective of stabilizing household cash
flow does not necessarily take on more FR (by changing If), he may also lower the
household buffer he/she maintains by changing CFof.
A third case is when off-farm cash flow is non-zero, stochastic but uncorrelated with
operational cash flow, e.g., when a farmer receives a variable return from financial
investments or he/his spouse has a flexible extra job. This is likely the most prevailing
situation, as farmers are motivated to seek uncorrelated income streams when looking
for off-farm opportunities (OECD, 2009). In this case, TRh can be expressed as:
TRh ¼
sCFh
CFh
¼
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
s2CFoþs2CFof
q
CFoI f þCFof
pb (12)
which increases with the riskiness of off-farm cash-flow, but decreases with expected
off-farm cash-flow.
Risk balancing and liquidity management: the role of household
components
In order to gain a better insight into the role of BR, FR and OFR in the determination of
TRh, we move away from operationalizing risk in variability terms and now look at risk
in a probabilistic sense. This will also shed light on one of the merits of considering
total household income and the risk thereof as determinants of farm household risk
behaviour. We now define TRh in terms of the probability that household cash flow is
equal or falls below a certain critical level z:
TRh ¼ P CFhpzð Þ (13)
Using Chebyshev’s theorem, an upper bound can be placed on this probability:
P CFhpzð Þp
s2CFh
CFhz
 2 (14)
We can now identify α as the maximum tolerable level of TRh a farm household is
willing to accept, leading to the following risk constraint equation:
P CFhpzð Þp
s2CFh
CFhz
 2pa (15)
As previously defined, household cash flow is equal to operational cash flow minus fixed
debt servicing obligation of the farm plus off-farm cash flow.We now further expand this
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definition by introducing the role of liquidity reserves, both belonging to the farm (Rf)
and to the household (Rh). One might think of liquidity reserves in terms of cash deposits
on a bank account, but also in terms of liquid assets (Barry et al., 1981). Further,
we introduce the role of new loans, both for the farm business (Lf) and household (Lh).
New loans also represent, in a way, a liquidity reserve and are dependent on the
borrowing capacity of the farm household. New loans may be used to refinance existing
loans and may also be used to reinvest in new farm or non-farm assets. We also introduce
household debt servicing obligations (Ih), corresponding to the household loans. Hence,
the total expression for household cash flow becomes:
CFh ¼ CFoI f þRf þLf þCFofI hþRhþLh (16)
Introducing this expression into the risk constraint Equation (15) and assuming that
operational cash flow and off-farm cash flow are the only two stochastic yet, by
assumption, uncorrelated elements in this equation we obtain:
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
s2CFoþs2CFof
q
p ffiffiffiap CFoI f þRf þLf þCFofI hþRhþLhz  (17)
Dividing each side by CFo and rearranging yields:ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
s2CFoþs2CFof
q
CFo
þ ffiffiffiap I f
CFo
 Rf
CFo
 Lf
CFo
CFof
CFo
þ I h
CFo
 Rh
CFo
 Lh
CFo
þ z
CFo
 
p ffiffiffiap
(18)
The conclusions from this equation are that a farm household can take a certain amount
of BR and OFR, which are reflected in the first term on the left-hand side, and this
tolerable amount of risk is increased by private and business liquidity reserves, private
and business additional loans and off-farm cash flow and decreased by the amount
of business and private debt servicing obligations and the size of the tolerable amount of
TRh. A farm household that wants to minimize the probability that household cash flow
falls below a certain threshold, will have to adjust any of the elements in the numerators
of the second element on the left-hand side equation.
Empirical evidence
Our conceptual model shows that the original Gabriel and Baker (1980) farm-level risk
balancing hypothesis may be extended to include a trade-off between total farm risk and
off-farm risk. Empirically validating the conceptual model, however, might prove difficult
in practice as data on off-farm activities of farm households are typically unavailable to
researchers or do not match the available farm-level accounting data sets. While off-farm
information is available in the USA (Mishra et al., 2002) and Canada ( Jetté-Nantel
et al., 2011), off-farm information collection is not mandatory in the European Farm
Accountancy Data Network (FADN) and accordingly only selected member states such
as The Netherlands and the UK do collect some household variables.
An empirical verification of our household risk balancing model is provided in de
Mey et al. (2015) for Swiss farm households in the period 2003-2012. The authors test an
adapted version of our conceptual model that focuses on three household risk
balancing components: first, farm FR; second, the share of off-farm income; and third,
relative consumption. Switzerland is an interesting case study area; not only because
459
Farm
household
risk balancing
the Swiss FADN data set contains the required detailed farm household information,
but also because off-farm employment opportunities have been readily available to
Swiss farmers in the study period. Estimating a fixed effects seemingly unrelated
regression model, the authors find evidence of household risk balancing behaviour: an
increase of 10 percentage points in BR levels leads Swiss farm households to lower
farm FR with 0.286 percentage points, increase the share of off-farm income in total
household income with 0.151 percentage points and lower the share of total household
income spent on consumption with 9.01 percentage points. A sub-sample analysis
further reveals heterogeneous household risk balancing effects according to farm size
(defined based on on-farm family labour usage) which corroborates the findings of
Uzea et al. (2014). Small farms appear to make most use of household-level risk
balancing strategies (altering off-farm income and consumption) whereas large farms
make more use of the original farm-level risk balancing strategy (altering farm FR).
Although not a formal proof of our model, the remainder of this section presents
several stylized findings in the literature that provide some further empirical
underpinning of our model. A well-covered topic in literature is that of off-farm
employment. Our model suggests that an increase in BR may induce farmers to spend
more time on off-farm work (given the other components in Equation 18). Conversely,
their engagement in an off-farm activity may explain why certain farmers pursue
rather risky farm activities. Particularly in North-America (Canada and the USA), this
has been an extensively studied topic in the agricultural economics profession. Gardner
(2005) writes that small farms are flourishing to an extent no one would have guessed
30 or 40 years ago, and that the main contributor to this finding is off-farm income
which has reduced the riskiness of the on-farm income stream. There have been many
empirical studies confirming the existence of a relationship between the level of farm
income and off-farm income (e.g. Weersink et al., 1998; Woldehanna et al., 2000; Mishra
et al., 2002, Lien et al., 2010).
More importantly, many papers confirm the existence of a link between the
variability of farm income and off-farm employment in the USA and Canada
(e.g. Jetté-Nantel et al., 2011; Kyle, 1993; Mishra and El-Osta, 2001; Mishra and
Goodwin, 1997; Mishra and Sandretto, 2002; Poon and Weersink, 2011). The main
consensus in the USA and Canada is that for risk averse farmers off-farm
employment increases in response to greater farm income variability and has helped
to lower the variability of total farm household income variability. In the EU, less
studies have been conducted – or reported – on this topic. In Ireland, Hennessy and
Rehman (2008) showed that decoupling, which has consequences for the level
and variability of farm returns, is likely to increase both the probability and the
amount of time spent on off-farm labour. In Austria, McNamara and Weiss (2005)
showed that on-farm diversification, a strategy to reduce BR from farming, had a
negative impact on the probability of pursuing in part-time farming. The broader
issue of pluriactivity of farm households has also been a topic well-covered in the
sociological and rural development literature, both in the North Americas
(e.g. Bessant, 2006) and especially in the EU, such as in the UK (Shucksmith and
Smith, 1991), Norway (Blakesaune, 1996), Greece (Barlas et al., 2001) and Ireland
(Kinsella et al., 2000). Pluriactivity refers to the diversification of activities of farm
households (both farm-centred and off-farm) where a potential motivator to start new
non-agricultural businesses was found to be reducing risk (Hansson et al., 2013).
Another link suggested by our model is that between off-farm employment and farm
FR. The existence of this link has empirically been shown in several studies looking
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at the determinants of debt usage (e.g. Collins and Karp, 1993, 1995; Katchova, 2005)
and the results of Mishra and Goodwin (1997) also suggest that highly leveraged farms
work more hours off-farm.
A final link related to off-farm employment is that with farm investments.
The direction and sign of this interaction has been shown to be context specific,
for instance depending on farm type, size, location and other factors (Andersson
et al., 2005). Hennessy and O’Brien (2008) found that the probability of investing in the
farm decreased in Ireland when the farm manager engaged in off-farm employment
whereas the effect of off-farm employment by the spouse was less clear.
Our model also suggests a link between off-farm investments and the components of
total farm risk: BR and FR. Serra et al. (2004) found that higher fluctuations in farm
income (i.e. BR) increase the share of non-farm assets in the farm household portfolio.
Mishra and Morehart (2001) found that leverage (i.e. FR) and farm diversification
decreased the possibility of off-farm investments, whereas non-farm aspects such
as off-farm income and the household’s net worth along with a farm operator’s age,
educational level, management skills increased the probability. Off-farm investments
(e.g. in financial assets) can be an effective farm household income risk management
tool similar to off-farm employment when the correlation between on-farm and off-farm
investments is low (Nartea and Webster, 2008; Serra et al., 2004).
As any other non-agricultural household, farm households will smooth their
consumption to some extent in function of total household income variability
(Langemeier and Patrick, 1990; Mishra et al., 2002). The smoothing response can also be
linked to BR, as most variability of total household income can be attributed to farm
income variability (Mishra and El-Osta, 2001). The consumption changes also differ
with regards to the source of income variability, as the marginal propensity to consume
from off-farm income and government payments was found to be significantly greater
than the propensity to consume from farm income (Carriker et al., 1993; Sand, 2002).
A final link suggested by our model is that between farm-level risk and liquidity
reserves; farm families will also maintain liquidity reserves/savings as a risk management
strategy (Remble et al., 2013). Facing higher future income uncertainty, farm households
will – besides smoothing future income – accumulate more savings, called precautionary
savings (Mishra and Chang, 2009). These savings were found to constitute about 8 per cent
of total household wealth for farm households (Mishra et al., 2013).
Discussion
With ample empirical support for the different possible interactions suggested by our
model, the household risk balancing hypothesis suggests some important implications
for the future of agricultural policy and research.
First, we advocate a micro-level, farm household approach to policy analysis (Offutt,
2002). In the EU, this is particularly important, given the ongoing CAP reform discussions
and challenging, given the continuing resistance to broaden the agricultural statistics
collection with household income data (Hill, 2002; United Nations, 2007). There is a need
for better data to analyse at a minimum the effects of changes in agricultural policy and
the general economic conditions on the well-being and behaviour of farm households,
ideally a panel data set of farm households is constructed that allows looking at volatility
and robust analyses (Boisvert, 2002). Policy analyses that are only focused on the farm
level ignore potentially important farm household responses that affect the achievement of
the intended policy effects. The assumptions that underlie most of the agricultural policy
measures are very much targeted towards those farm families with a small household
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buffer or low possibilities to increase this buffer. Empirical evidence shows that this is in
many countries not the majority of farm households. As such, expectations about
responses of farmers to agricultural policy instruments, remain unfulfilled.
Second, our model suggests that current EU risk management policy, which is
gradually moving towards the World Bank approach (Freshwater, 2007), allowing for
subsidies on insurance premiums, should encompass a more broad view on
agricultural risk management. Currently, the focus of agricultural policy is on just
one of the elements of the household risk balancing equation, BR, since it is guided by
a policy analysis framework that is focused at the farm level. Farm households,
however, have created a new reality, one in which pluriactivity or part-time farming
is the norm, rather than a marginal phenomenon restricted to small and less efficient
farmers. In this new reality, farm households in the EU internalize the risks inherent
in farming, by adjustments in off-farm risk stemming from consumption, off-farm
employment, private liquidity reserves and private loans. Policies that aim to
reallocate resources to more risky activities that provide larger benefits to society,
in terms of resource efficiency and value creation, might consider targeting the other
way around. More specifically, rural development policies that encourage multiple job
holdings, or enable farm families to easily attract cash flow from non-agricultural
sources may just as well induce them to engage in more risky farming activities,
because it increases their total risk bearing capacity. In this respect, policies that
enable farm households to maintain or even increase their household buffer, may be
able to assume more BR, thereby allocating resources to more efficient activities and
increasing their resilience ( Jetté-Nantel et al., 2011).
Third, the model also shows why, in certain sectors, some farm families persist even
against all economic rationality, while others go bankrupt, or at least are in serious
problems. Some farm families have built up a considerable household buffer or assume
very low FR. These households are much less affected by variability in price and
production than others. We believe that especially for such farm households, our model
provides a valuable extension to the original Gabriel and Baker (1980) model.
Our model suggests that the overreliance on price support policies in the past might
have pushed farmers towards more FR and very low household buffers (Turvey and
Baker, 1990; Kostov and Lingard, 2003; Woldehanna et al., 2000; Ifft et al., 2015).
Recently, with the shift towards less distortive policies, coinciding with increased
international trade, BR may have increased well above the constraint set by financial
and household risk. More specifically, the expectation that farmers may alter the
allocation of resources, in response to price stabilization policies, to more efficient
production systems might be jeopardized. Gabriel and Baker (1980) assert that as a
reaction, farmers may assume more FR. Our model shows that farmers may also
change their household strategies, increasing their off-farm risk.
Conclusions
In this paper, we extend the original Gabriel and Baker (1980) risk balancing
framework to the household level. We analytically show that, confronted with an
exogenous change in BR, farm households may also respond by a change in household
buffering strategies and not only by a change in their financial position, as posited by
Gabriel and Baker (1980). Empirical evidence from previous literature regarding
elements of our model is presented and important implications for policy makers and
researchers are discussed. Future research could empirically validate our model for
countries were data on both on-farm and off-farm activities of farm households are
462
AFR
75,4
available. In the EU, however, this might prove difficult as only a few EU member
states (e.g. The Netherlands (Vrolijk et al., 2009)) meet these data requirements;
comparable data across EU member states is non-existent ruling out a cross-country
analysis. Acknowledging that the farm household is the preferred level of analysis for
risk (management) research, our model advocates broadening agricultural statistics
collection with household income data. Another important implication of our model is
that EU policy makers have an extended set of policy instruments at hand to ensure a
stable income and enhance the well-being of farm households by also considering rural
development programs that facilitate off-farm opportunities. Future policies should
account for the increasing heterogeneity of the agricultural sector and acknowledge the
multiple dimensions of farm households. As the household situation will influence a
farmers’ decision to diversify their farm, studies are needed in order to understand
future farm sector developments as this a highly prioritized themes in EU rural
development policy (Hansson et al., 2013).
Notes
1. Considering the farm household as the decision making unit is accomplished in household
models that explicitly acknowledge that farm-level and household-level choices are
endogenous and inseparable (Chayanov, 1966; Singh et al., 1986). Farm household models are
commonly based on the behavioural assumption of the maximization of subjective expected
household utility. In our framework, we further identify that farm households are
risk-constrained by aiming for an optimal level of household-level risk (see Section 4).
2. Gabriel and Baker (1980) assume, for most of their reasoning, that the standard deviation of
cash flows with debt financing equals that without debt financing. This assumption may
hold in practice, as debt financing is most often used to increase the scale of current
operations, rather than removing some of the uncertainty inherent in current operations.
Some farmers, however, take on additional new loans, thereby increasing debt to asset ratio,
in order to decrease business risk. Indeed, many investments to decrease the risk inherent in
normal farm operations require large funds, which most farmers can only acquire though
debt financing. For these farmers, this assumption will be flawed.
3. Note that √ represents the principal (positive) square root throughout the manuscript.
4. The size of β depends on personal characteristics (e.g. the level of risk aversion of the
farm operator), farm-level factors (e.g. profitability) and exogenous factors (e.g. general
economic conditions).
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